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A lively debate among students of parliamentary democracy concerns how coalition governments 
build their policy proposals. Some scholars maintain that government declarations mirror the position 
of the median party in Parliament; others argue that these proposals better agree with the weighted 
mean of the coalition parties’ electoral promises. This paper sheds lights on this puzzle by 
investigating the role played by several political actors in shaping government declarations in two 
dimensions: the ideological left-right scale and a genuinely policy-based welfare scale. The results 
reveal that the agenda setters on the two dimensions do not coincide. On the left-right scale, the Prime 
Minister’s party plays a leading role. On the welfare scale, government declarations are affected by 
the party of the median legislator in Parliament and by the parties of the labour and social affairs 
ministers. Furthermore, government declarations on the welfare dimension tend to drift rightward 
with adverse economic conditions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1950s, coalition theorists have tried to explain how coalition governments make their policy 
proposals. To recall one of the most influential contribution, McDonald and Budge (2005: 147-148) 
found that declared cabinet position better accords with the position of the median voter than with the 
position of the parliamentary median party or the weighted mean position of coalition parties. 
However, employing the same dataset, Warwick (2001, 2011) obtained different results: he revealed 
that declared cabinet position responds to the weighted mean position of coalition parties and, where 
present, to the position of external support parties.  
Taking our cue from the so far mixed results provided in the literature, this paper investigates to what 
extent declared cabinet position corresponds to the policy stances staked out by governing parties at 
election time in their manifestos. Furthermore, drawing on established theoretical arguments, the 
paper evaluates to what extent other political actors (i.e. the parliamentary median party, the Prime 
Minister’s/PM’s party and individual ministers) are able to influence declared cabinet position 
beyond their contribution to the weighted mean position of coalition parties. Delving into the possible 
answers to these questions is relevant inasmuch it tells us about what Powell refers to as the ‘chain 
of responsiveness’ between voter policy preferences and government policy positions (2005: 62-76). 
Indeed, if the parliamentary median party proves to be the key player in determining declared cabinet 
position, then which government forms after the dust of the election is settled becomes less significant 
than scholars have so far assumed. Conversely, if declared cabinet position reflects a compromise 
among the coalition partners or if it is largely given by the positions of individual ministers, then the 
result of bargaining over government formation becomes highly relevant for explaining and 
predicting policy outcomes. 
To date, studies dealing with the degree of ideological congruence between the electoral promises 
made by parties at election time and government policy stances have largely focused on the 
ideological right-left (RILE) dimension. This choice is consistent with Dahl’s (1961: 223-328) 
pluralistic approach to politics, according to which the actors involved (i.e. coalition parties), their 
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electoral promises and the resources they own (i.e. their parliamentary seats share) determine the 
policy content in different fields. In a sentence: politics determines policies. 
However, the reverse of this often-cited sentence, Lowi’s claim according to which policies determine 
politics (1972), also deserves our attention. Indeed, Lowi’s work (1972) reminds us that the issue at 
stake is likely to affect the relative weight of the actors involved in the formulation of the government 
policy proposal. 
Accordingly, this paper contributes to the existing literature concerning how coalition governments 
formulate their policy statements by contrasting the degree of congruence between declared cabinet 
position and the weighted mean position of governing parties as expressed in their electoral 
manifestos on two dimensions: the traditionally employed RILE scale and a genuinely policy-based 
welfare scale. This comparison checks whether the actors able to influence the policies that coalition 
partners jointly agree to take forward in the government declaration coincide.  
To achieve this goal, the paper draws on a largely neglected and long abandoned part of the data 
collection made by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; MARPOR 2014): namely, the coding 
of government declarations in ten European countries with the same coding scheme that has been 
used to analyse party manifestos over the entire post-war period (Budge et al. 2001). 
Results demonstrate that the actors able to shape government declarations on the two dimensions do 
not coincide. On the ideological RILE dimension, which includes several policy areas, the PM’s party 
determines the content of the declared cabinet position beyond its contribution to the weighted mean 
position of coalition parties. Thus, the results suggest that when the party of the PM is forced to 
compromise with the other coalition parties on several policy dimensions, it is able to pull declared 
cabinet position towards its ideal point by pivoting and counterbalancing among alternative solutions. 
Instead, the parliamentary median party and competent ministers (i.e. labour and social affairs 
ministers) are key players on the welfare dimension. Welfare policies, indeed, ask governments to 
distribute societal wealth to specific groups, usually subtracting resources from other societal 
segments. Given the distributive and redistributive conflicts entailed by this policy domain and the 
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blame-sharing strategies pursued by governing parties forced to retrench the welfare state, the party 
owning the median legislator in the parliamentary arena is highly involved in decision-making 
processes, together with the competent ministers. Furthermore, rising inflation experienced by parties 
in office seems to make declared cabinet position to drift rightward.  
The paper is structured as follows. The section that follows critically reviews the theories advanced 
in the literature and details the research hypotheses. Next, the dataset and the model specification are 
described. Then, in the main analytical section, the role played by governing parties, the 
parliamentary median party, the PM’s party and individual ministers in shaping declared cabinet 
positions both on the RILE and the welfare dimensions are assessed. The last section discusses the 
main findings and indicates paths for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MAIN HYPOTHESES 
Declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension: who is expected to shape it and why  
Coalition governments have to confront a fundamental challenge in policymaking that is absent under 
single-party governments: namely, government policy proposals on any specific issue have to be 
made jointly by parties that may express divergent policy positions and that are separately held 
accountable at the election time. This challenge raises a critical question: whose policy positions are 
ultimately reflected in government policy proposals? Thus far, the literature has provided at least four 
alternative accounts to answer this question.  
A first account maintains that declared cabinet position simply reflects a compromise among the 
governing parties. This intuitive expectation rests on the extension of Gamson’s law (1961) from the 
office dimension (i.e. the quantitative allocation of portfolios among coalition partners) to the policy 
dimension (i.e. the policy proposals ratified by coalition partners). 
Taking advantage of the Government Declarations Data on ten European countries (Budge et al. 
2001), Warwick (2001, 2011) demonstrated that declared cabinet positions on the RILE dimension 
correspond to the mean position of governing parties as derived from their electoral manifestos, 
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weighted by their seats shares. Moreover, he proved that other political actors are able to bias declared 
cabinet positions towards their ideal points: namely, the party holding the finance portfolio, the 
formateur party (i.e. the party that was assigned the task of putting the coalition together), 
parliamentary parties (2001) and external support parties (2011). More recently, Martin and Vanberg 
(2014) found strong evidence that government-sponsored legislation adopted in Denmark, Germany 
and the Netherlands since the 1980s reflects a compromise among the policy positions of coalition 
partners. Taking our cue from these results, we formulate our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Declared cabinet position corresponds to the weighted mean position of the coalition parties, 
with their share of seats in the lower chamber constituting the weights. 
 
Hypothesis 1 serves as a baseline assumption in this paper. This approach is common in various 
studies on coalition politics and parliamentary governments (See also Grofman 1982). However, in 
addition to this extension of Gamson’s law (1961), alternative accounts on the distribution of policy 
payoffs to the members of multiparty governments will be taken into consideration. Note that the 
following accounts are not considered as full alternatives to hypothesis 1, but rather as causing 
deviations from the expected Gamson’s result.  
A second account is the well-known median voter theorem (Black 1958; Downs 1957: 142-163) 
according to which the party controlling the median legislator will have a stronger bargaining power 
than the other coalition parties because there are no other points in the ideological space that are 
preferred by a majority to its ideal point. Accordingly: 
 
H2: Declared cabinet position is biased away from the weighted mean position of the coalition parties 
towards the position of the parliamentary median party. 
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Testing the median voter theorem, Budge and Laver (1992b: 409-464) found that declared cabinet 
position on the RILE dimension did not mirror the positions of either the median party or the 
predominant party. Notwithstanding these discouraging results, McDonald and Budge (2005: 147-
148) found a reasonably strong relationship between declared cabinet position and that of the 
parliamentary median party.  
These mixed results suggest that declared cabinet position may reflect other influences (Warwick 
2001, 2011). Among those influences, this paper focuses on the role played by the PM’s party (third 
account) and by the ministers having jurisdictions in specific policy fields (fourth account). 
The third account refers to the general class of proposer models (Baron 1998; Diermeier and 
Feddersen 1998), which suggests that the formateur party is able to bias declared cabinet position 
towards its ideal point beyond its share of seats. These models maintain that the formateur party, 
being in charge to propose an alternative to the status quo, will propose a policy that makes the median 
voter indifferent between accepting or rejecting its proposal (i.e. the median voter ideal point will be 
located in the interval between the status quo and the formateur ideal point). In this way, the proposal 
of the formateur party will be accepted. In this paper, the formateur party coincides with the party of 
the PM (Woldendorp et al. 2000). 
 
H3: Declared cabinet position is biased away from the weighted mean position of the coalition parties 
towards the position of the PM’s party1. 
 
Finally, the fourth account, the portfolio allocation model by Laver and Shepsle (1996: 281-285), 
assumes that ministers are policy dictators in their jurisdictions. This model maintains that the policy 
positions of the minister party will prevail in the specific policy area governed by that minister. In 
this regard, Warwick (2001) demonstrated that the RILE position of the party holding the finance 
minister only has a modest influence on declared cabinet positions.  
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H4: Declared cabinet position is biased away from the weighted mean position of the coalition parties 
towards the position of the party of the competent minister. 
 
Going beyond the left-right continuum by taking a deeper look at the welfare dimension  
The large majority of the studies here reviewed only focused on the ideological RILE scale. By 
contrast, this paper investigates how coalition governments build their policy proposals by developing 
two parallel analyses. The first tests the four hypotheses listed so far on the RILE dimension; the 
second extends the same analysis to the pro-anti welfare state expansion dimension. Indeed, only the 
comparison between these two dimensions allows verifying whether the political actors able to pull 
declared cabinet position towards their ideal points coincide.  
We chose the welfare dimension for several reasons. It is the most debated policy area in the existing 
literature on the degree of congruence between parties’ long lasting ideological positions, their 
contextual electoral pledges and subsequent policy choices (e.g. Barnes 2013; Häusermann et al. 
2013). 
The stream of literature known as Partisan Theory (e.g. Hibbs 1992), for example, expects governing 
parties to maximize the interests of their core electoral constituencies. Left-wing governments, being 
the advocates of the working class, are expected to fight for welfare state enlargement or at least to 
minimize welfare state retrenchment; right-wing governments, being supported by upscale groups, 
are expected to favour a reduction of state intervention into the economic sphere.   
In the same vein, McDonald and Budge (2005: 149-150) applied the median voter theorem (Black 
1958; Downs 1957: 142-63) to the welfare domain with encouraging results: the welfare position of 
the median legislator positively correlates with declared cabinet position on the same topic.  
However, other scholars reply that parties’ ability to shape welfare policies has been reduced, if not 
completely erased, by institutional configurations (e.g. Laver and Shepsle 1996: 61-124), divided 
government and shared policy control (e.g. Tsebelis 2002: 187-206), economic constraints or policy 
legacies (e.g. Pierson 1994: 27-50). 
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Studies in this field search for a connection between governing parties’ positions and social 
expenditure or aggregate indexes of welfare state generosity. These studies, however, tend to 
operationalize government partisanship through dummy or categorical variables indicating whether 
the cabinet is more left- or right-leaning. Even when more sophisticated measures based on party 
manifestos or expert surveys are employed, governing parties’ positions are put in direct relationship 
with social policy outcomes without investigating the intermediate passage between the positions 
expressed by governing parties in their manifestos at election time and the declaration pronounced 
by each newly formed government at the beginning of the mandate. This paper intends to shed light 
on this missing link. 
Moreover, we chose the welfare dimension because it is related to the most conflict-ridden cleavage 
in industrial democracies, the capital-labour cleavage (Pierson, 1994: 27-50). Thus, governments are 
expected to make considerable efforts because they know they will be largely evaluated according to 
their achievements in this field. Furthermore, the role of the State in providing social services is the 
most debated topic in government declarations (Martin and Vanberg 2014). Finally, providing 
welfare support is a large part of what industrial democracies do. Thus, the focus on this domain, 
which implies heavy budgetary consequences, allows elucidation of the so-called politics of 
constrained choice. 
As explained by Lowi (1972), the policy domain at stake affects the actors taking part in decision-
making processes and their relative weights. He applied his well-known policy taxonomy (i.e. 
distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituent policies) to the American presidential politics 
from Roosevelt to Johnson, showing that the Congress played a major role in distributive and 
regulatory policies, while the executive power was stronger in shaping redistributive policies.  
Adapting Lowi’s theoretical claim to this analysis, the actors able to shape declared cabinet positions 
on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions are expected to differ. 
Indeed, on the genuinely policy-based welfare dimension, which typically involves distributive and 
redistributive conflicts among societal segments, the legislative assembly (i.e. for distributive 
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policies) and the competent ministers (i.e. for redistributive ones) are likely to exert significant 
influences on the formulation of declared cabinet position.  
Conversely, on the ideological RILE dimension, which is a super-issue involving heterogeneous 
policy areas (Together with the macroeconomic dimension, it includes military policies, human 
rights, internationalism, constitutionalism, political authority, traditional morality, law and order, 
etc.), the PM’s party is expected to play the major role. The PM, indeed, is likely to pull the declared 
cabinet position towards his/her ideal point by balancing and counterbalancing among the policy 
proposals formulated by the other ministers and coalition parties in several policy areas. 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Dependent variables 
The key ingredient to build the two dependent variables employed in the analysis is provided by a 
long-abandoned part of the data collection made by the CMP, the Government Declarations Data 
(Budge et al. 2001). It contains the coding of government declarations in ten European countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden) from the end of World War II to the end of the 1990s (Appendix Table 1 reports the time 
covered for individual countries). Government declarations are public speeches pronounced in 
institutional settings (i.e., usually the Parliament) by a head of state on behalf of a recently formed 
government or by a PM at the time of his/her investiture debate (Laver and Budge 1992: 19). These 
statements initiate the governing process by detailing the official programme to which the government 
publicly commits itself. Accordingly, they are an intent, rather than a fulfilment, with regard to 
policies (McDonald and Budge 2005: 141).2  
Because of bargaining, anticipated administrative and practical constraints and the need to obtain 
parliamentary approval, government declarations differ from the ‘weighted wish list’ derived from 
the electoral manifestos of the coalition parties (Budge et al. 2001: 172-174). Indeed, party manifestos 
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are static documents written by parties just before election time (Dolezal et al. 2012). Ray defined 
these documents as contracts between parties and voters containing a realistic assessment of the 
policies that they would implement if elected (Ray 2007). However, together with policy pledges, 
party manifestos contain party advertising and rather abstract statements of the party identity and 
philosophy. Notably, Dolezal et al. (2012) underlined that since party manifestos are written to be 
used during the electoral campaign, they embed positive references to past party records and attacks 
towards their competitors (i.e. negative campaigning)3.  
The difference between government declarations and the electoral manifestos of coalition parties also 
emerges from the content analysis of these documents conducted by the CMP. Indeed, government 
declarations are usually shorter than party manifestos (in each country, the mean number of quasi-
sentences in government declarations is lower than the mean number of quasi-sentences in party 
manifestos). Moreover, by comparing the policy content of these two types of documents, it emerges 
that the electoral dynamics that dominate party manifestos are substituted by more credible policy 
pledges in government declarations. Indeed, in its investiture speech, the government is supposed to 
publicly confront itself with the Members of Parliament (MPs), shifting the dimension of conflict 
from purely ideological positions to issues more related to the actual agenda of the cabinet. 
Accordingly, policy fields such as the need to keep military treaty obligations, to support international 
organizations and the European Union, to enforce law and order, to improve government and 
administrative efficiency and to reduce budget deficit are more frequent in government declarations 
than in party manifestos. 
Having clarified the difference between government declarations and the electoral manifestos of the 
coalition parties, we detail the operationalization of our dependent variables. The first dependent 
variable, declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension, is measured through the well-known 
method proposed by Budge and Laver (1992a: 1-64). Specifically, the position held by each 
government on the RILE dimension is equal to the difference between the proportion of each 
government declaration devoted to 13 categories identified as right-wing and the proportion devoted 
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to 13 left-wing ones4. The theoretical range of the RILE scale is -100 (extreme left) +100 (extreme 
right), although in practice this variable is comprised between -45.8 and +55.1 (See Appendix Table 
2).  
The second dependent variable, declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension, is calculated by 
subtracting the proportion of each government declaration devoted to welfare state expansion (CMP 
variables per503 and per504) from the proportion devoted to welfare state retrenchment (CMP 
variable per505). The theoretical range of the WELFARE scale is -100 (welfare state expansion) +100 
(welfare state retrenchment), but in the sample the variable ranges from -40.9 and +3.2 (See Appendix 
Table 2). 
The CMP variables employed to build the welfare scale are included in the formula used to estimate 
the RILE scale. To what extent do government welfare positions resemble those on the RILE 
dimension? To answer this question, Figure 1 plots the pairwise correlation coefficient between the 
two.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The variable declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension is positively correlated with that on 
the RILE dimension (i.e. 0.565; see Appendix Table 3). However, this coefficient is far from being 
equal to one, thus suggesting that these two dependent variables, even if similar, do not describe 
exactly the same phenomenon. This result gives reason to test whether the same political actors affect 
declared cabinet positions on these two dimensions. 
 
Main independent and control variables 
Concerning independent variables, we used the CMP coding of party electoral manifestos 
(MARPOR, 2014) to measure the weighted mean position of governing parties, the position of the 
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median party in Parliament, that of the PM’s party and that of the parties holding the finance, the 
labour and the social affairs portfolios. 
Using Seki and Williams (2014), we merged the CMP dataset (MARPOR 2014) with the information 
on government compositions provided by Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000). The cabinet 
weighted mean on the RILE dimension corresponds to the mean of the RILE positions of cabinet 
parties, weighted by their share of seats in the lower chamber (Powell 2009). Appendix Table 3 shows 
that the cabinet weighted mean on the RILE dimension is positively correlated with the declared 
cabinet position on the same dimension (0.446). This coefficient, however, is far from being equal to 
one, making the case for other actors to affect the first dependent variable. 
Similarly, we assessed the cabinet weighted mean on the welfare dimension as the mean of the welfare 
positions of cabinet parties, weighted by their share of seats in the lower chamber. As before, the 
correlation coefficient is far from being equal to one (0.401; see Appendix Table 3). 
The positions of the median legislator on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions have been 
calculated by assuming that legislator positions can be represented by the positions of the parties to 
which they belong. To identify the party containing the median legislator on the RILE dimension, 
parliamentary parties have to be arrayed in a left-right order. To do the same on the welfare 
dimension, parties have to be ranked according to their scores on the welfare issue5.  
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the positions of the median legislator influence declared cabinet positions 
on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions beyond their contribution to the weighted mean. As in 
Warwick (2011), these types of effects are captured by two variables. The first variable, median party 
– cabinet distance on the RILE dimension, corresponds to the RILE position of the median party 
minus the cabinet weighted mean on the same dimension. The second variable, median party – 
cabinet distance on the welfare dimension, measures the difference between the welfare position of 
the median party and the cabinet weighted mean on the same dimension. 
Hypothesis 3 maintains that the position of the PM’s party influences declared cabinet positions on 
the RILE and on the welfare dimensions beyond its contribution to the weighted mean. This party has 
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been identified through the Woldendorp, Keman and Budge’s (2000) dataset. Thus, the variable PM’s 
party – cabinet distance on the RILE dimension is equal to the RILE position of the PM’s party minus 
the cabinet weighted mean on the same dimension. Similarly, the variable PM’s party - cabinet 
distance on the welfare dimension records the deviation of the PM’s party from the cabinet weighted 
mean on the welfare dimension. 
The last political actors that are potentially able to affect declared cabinet positions are ministers 
(Hypothesis 4). Laver and Shepsle’s portfolio allocation model (1996: 281-285) is less easily tested 
with the data at hand because the RILE and the welfare scales appear too encompassing to be under 
the exclusive control of any one minister. However, following Warwick (2011), it is possible to assert 
whether declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension is heavily influenced by the position of the 
party holding the finance minister and whether declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension is 
heavily influenced by those of the parties holding the labour and social affairs portfolios. These types 
of effects can be verified by determining whether the deviations of the positions of these ministers 
from the cabinet weighted mean (i.e. finance minister – cabinet distance on the RILE dimension and 
labour/social affairs ministers – cabinet distance on the welfare dimension) exert any independent 
influence on declared cabinet positions.  
All the hypotheses formulated in section 1 focus on the political actors able to affect the final 
formulation of declared cabinet positions on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions. However, 
influences coming from the external reality are possible, as well.  
In particular, declared cabinet position is likely to deviate from the coalition parties’ electoral 
promises towards a more rightist attitude in response to adverse economic conditions. Even if 
reasonable, this expectation has not found empirical support so far (Warwick 2001, 2011). This paper 
controls for adverse economic conditions through the following variables. Change in inflation rate 
records the difference between the inflation rate registered in the month in which the government was 
formed and the inflation rate registered in the last month of the mandate of the preceding government. 
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Similarly, the variable change in unemployment rate registers the corresponding difference for the 
unemployment rate6. The same occurs for the variable change in GDP (Strøm et al. 2008). 
Appendix Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables listed so far, while Appendix 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 display pairwise correlations.  
Concerning the choice of the functional form, it may be the case that declared cabinet position will 
be influenced by the position of its predecessor (serial correlation) and that declared cabinet position 
in one country may be systematically different from that in another country (panel heteroscedasticity). 
Thus, all the models include a first-order lag of the dependent variable and employ panel-corrected 
standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).  
The lagged dependent variables in this analysis are the declared cabinet positions on the RILE and 
on the welfare dimensions of the immediately preceding government. The inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variables captures the idea that declared cabinet positions may be influenced by ‘the dead 
weight’ of past policies: whatever policy position a coalition government agrees on, it may be 
necessary or expedient to move policies to that ideal point only gradually7. Using McDonald and 
Budge’s words, ‘policies change from one government to the next, but not much and not rapidly’ 
(2005: 171).  
Finally, all the models embed a set of country dummies to control for time-invariant cross-country 
differences (Wilson and Butler 2007).  
 
RESULTS 
The testing procedure will be guided by the notion that absent any other influences, declared cabinet 
position should reflect the weighted mean position of governing parties (Hypotheses 1). The 
hypotheses regarding the other political actors (Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4), indeed, involve hypothesis 1 
as a reference point.  
This analytical section is structured into three parts. A first subsection investigates the role played by 
the additional political actors (i.e. the parliamentary median party, the PM’s party and the party 
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holding the finance or the labour/social affairs ministers) on the RILE dimension. Next, a second 
subsection replicates the same analysis on the welfare dimension.  
Note that the effects of each political actor on declared cabinet positions are investigated one by one. 
This choice is imposed by data shortage: indeed, the Government Declarations Data (Budge et al. 
2001) provides complete information on just 157 governments (See Appendix Table 1), while the 
hypotheses to be tested are four on each dimension, without taking into account economic control 
variables and country fixed effects. However, acknowledging the importance of identifying the net 
effect of each independent variable when all other influences are controlled for, a third subsection 
displays two additional model specifications, in which declared cabinet positions on the RILE and on 
the welfare dimensions are regressed on the most important independent variables referring to both 
political actors and economic conditions8. The results displayed in this third subsection clarify the 
previous ones. 
 
Influences on declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension 
The models displayed in Table 1 prove that declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension is 
strongly affected by the position of its predecessor and by the weighted mean position of coalition 
parties (Hypothesis 1). In detail, model M1 proves that if the weighted mean position of the coalition 
parties moves one point to the right, the position staked out by the government in its declaration is 
likely to increase by approximately 0.3 points.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
However, the beta referring to the weighted mean position of coalition parties is positive and 
significant but far from being equal to one. Thus, it is worth looking for additional political actors 
and external forces able to shape the declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension in addition to 
the coalition partners. 
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Model M2 does not support hypothesis 2, according to which governments respond to the position of 
the parliamentary median party: indeed, the variable median party – cabinet distance does not reach 
statistical significance. 
Models M3 and M4 lead to the same conclusions for hypotheses 3 and 4, according to which the PM’s 
party and the party holding the finance minister are likely to bias the declared cabinet position towards 
their ideal points. Indeed, the betas referring to the variables PM’s party – cabinet and finance minister 
– cabinet distances are not statistically significant9. However, the variable PM’s party – cabinet 
distance is quite near to conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.105), suggesting that 
hypothesis 4 deserves deeper investigation
10. 
The results discussed so far demonstrate that, even taking into account the RILE positions of the 
parliamentary median party, the PM’s party and the finance minister, substantial differences remain 
between the declared cabinet position and the weighted mean position of governing parties. These 
two variables, indeed, systematically differ from each other in their long-term country-level 
equilibria, corresponding to the country means. Government declarations contain stances that are 
substantially more right wing (the average across the pooled dataset is -0.22) than those that cabinet 
parties would have preferred, judging from their own electoral manifestos (the average is -7.97). This 
tendency holds within every country but two (i.e. France and Ireland). This empirical regularity may 
reflect the preoccupation of governments with ‘administrative concerns and ongoing matters of 
government which have not necessarily entered into the election campaign’ (Laver and Budge 1992: 
410-412). Might the economic conditions experienced by governments help explain this rightward 
shift? All the models displayed in Table 1 are clear in rejecting this explanation: declared cabinet 
position on the RILE dimension is insensitive to changes in inflation rate, unemployment rate and 
GDP since the end of the preceding government mandate. 
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Influences on declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension 
Do the political actors and external forces affecting declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension 
behave in the same way on the welfare dimension? Table 2 answers this question. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The weighted mean position of governing parties determines declared cabinet position on the welfare 
scale as well (Hypothesis 1). Indeed, model M5 demonstrates that if the weighted mean position of 
coalition parties moves one point towards a more contractionary attitude, the position staked out by 
the government is likely to move in the same direction by 0.12 points.  
However, as for the RILE dimension, the coefficient referring to the weighted mean position of 
governing parties is far from one. Moreover, once we look for political actors and external forces able 
to bias declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension, the estimates tell a different story from 
the one discussed above. 
Model M6 supports hypothesis 2 demonstrating that the median party plays a crucial role: indeed, a 
unitary increase in the variable median party – cabinet distance moves the declared cabinet position 
approximately 0.3 points towards a more contractionary attitude. 
Model M7 shows that the welfare position of the PM’s party is unable to affect the dependent variable. 
Accordingly, hypothesis 3 is rejected. 
Things are different for the position of the party holding the labour and the social affairs ministers. 
Indeed, as displayed by model M8, this party is likely to bias the declared cabinet position towards its 
ideal point by approximately 0.007 points. However, the magnitude of this effect and the level of 
statistical significance, which is above conventional standards, cast some doubt on the acceptance of 
hypothesis 4, which deserves deeper investigation. 
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The systematic rightward shift in declared cabinet positions registered on the RILE dimension appears 
on the welfare dimension, as well: across the pooled dataset, the country mean for declared cabinet 
position is equal to -7.146, while that for the cabinet weighted mean is equal to -11.719.  
The models displayed in Table 2 test whether this shift can be explained by economic circumstances. 
Declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension seems to be affected by changes in the inflation 
rate since the end of the preceding government: a unitary increase in this variable makes the declared 
cabinet position move towards a welfare a state retrenchment attitude by approximately half a point. 
However, changes in the unemployment rate and GDP do not affect the dependent variable. 
 
Simultaneous influences on declared cabinet position on the RILE and the welfare dimensions 
The two previous subsections estimated the potential effects of each political actor on declared 
cabinet position on the RILE and on the welfare dimensions one by one because the dataset provides 
complete information on just 157 governments in ten countries (See Appendix Table 1). However, to 
identify the net effect of each independent variable when all other influences are controlled for, Table 
3 displays two additional models in which declared cabinet position on the RILE and the welfare 
dimensions are regressed on the most important independent variables at once.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Overall, the results are consistent with the previous ones. First, when all the other influences are 
controlled for, the parliamentary median party confirms its inability to bias the declared cabinet 
position on the RILE dimension (M9), while it proves to be crucial on the welfare dimension (M10). 
Second, the PM’s party demonstrates the ability to bias declared cabinet position on the RILE 
dimension (M9), but not on the welfare dimension (M10). These findings demonstrate that the PM’s 
party exerts extra leverage on declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension, which is absent for 
the parliamentary median party on the same dimension. Accordingly, when these two key positions 
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are occupied by the same party (see endnote n. 10), it is the fact of being the party of the PM, rather 
than the median legislator status, that grants this party its additional effect on declared cabinet position 
on the RILE dimension. On the welfare dimension, the mechanism is reversed: in the case of 
overlapping between the party of the PM and the median legislator, it is the median legislator status 
that grants this party extra leverage on the declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension.  
Third, these additional models shed light on hypothesis 4. The position of the party holding the 
finance portfolio is unable to affect declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension, while that of 
the party holding the labour and the social affairs ministers has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension.  
Finally, a rising inflation rate from the end of the previous cabinet does not affect the declared cabinet 
position on the RILE dimension, but seems to have a statistically significant effect on the welfare 
dimension, shifting the declared cabinet position towards a more contractionary attitude11. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper investigated several hypotheses concerning the main determinants of the positions adopted 
by coalition governments in ten Western European parliamentary democracies since the end of 
WWII. As highlighted by the literature review, previous influential studies based only on the left-
right dimension provided by the CMP coding of coalition government declarations and party 
manifestos provided mixed results.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by adding a genuinely policy-based pro-anti welfare 
scale to the ideological RILE scale traditionally employed. This choice allows checking whether the 
actors able to influence declared cabinet position on these two dimensions coincide.  
The results demonstrate that there is a connection between declared cabinet policy stances and the 
weighted mean positions of coalition parties as derived from their electoral manifestos both on the 
RILE and on the welfare dimensions. Indeed, this connection appears in both models M1 and M5, 
making the lack of fit between declared cabinet positions and coalition parties’ electoral promises 
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lamented by Budge and Laver (1992b: 409-464) and McDonald and Budge (2005: 145-148) appear 
overly pessimistic. Moreover, this first finding is consistent with the results obtained by Martin and 
Vanberg in the cases of Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (2014). 
However, the relationship between declared cabinet position and the weighted mean position of 
coalition parties is far from the one-to-one correspondence needed to affirm that Gamson’s rule 
(1961) applies to policy payoffs as well as to portfolio allocations, making Warwick’s claims 
appearing overly optimistic, as well (2001, 2011).  
Notably, the results suggest that other political actors and external forces are able to bias declared 
cabinet positions. Moreover, such political actors and external forces do not behave in the same way 
on the two dimensions studied here.  
Starting from the RILE scale, the findings seems to support, at least in part, the central requirement 
of proposer models because the PM’s party exploits its position by extracting more than its 
proportional share of the policy payoff. Notice that the agenda-setting power of the PM’s party may 
also originate from PM’s personal traits, such as charismatic leadership and communicational style 
(See endnote 1). 
Moving to the welfare dimension, our results suggest that Lowi’s motto, according to which ‘policies 
determine politics’ (1972), is partially true: the political actors shaping declared cabinet position over 
the welfare dimension do not coincide with the ones on the RILE scale.  
In particular, in addition to the weighted mean position of coalition parties, which continues to be a 
determinant of declared cabinet position, the parliamentary median party and the competent ministers 
look crucial. As expected, the distributive and redistributive nature of the programmes included in 
the welfare dimension, which see economic resources to be provided to specific societal segments, 
usually at the expense of other groups, grants additional leverage in decision-making processes to the 
party of the median legislator and the party of the labour and social affairs ministers. 
The finding of a significant effect emanating from the parliamentary median party on the welfare 
dimension is intriguing. Indeed, this party is that of the PM in 43% of the governments in our sample. 
21 
Moreover, 51% of the parties that occupy the median parliamentary position on the RILE dimension 
are also that of the median legislator on the welfare dimension. However, once we control for the 
influences emanating from the key political actors simultaneously (see Table 3), the median legislator 
status proves to be relevant in shaping declared cabinet position only on the welfare dimension (see 
also Appendix Table 6). This result suggests to scholars focused on the degree of congruence between 
government partisanship and policy outcomes in the welfare domain to seriously consider the policy 
positions of the party of the median legislator when dealing with the measurement of their 
independent variable. Indeed, this party is likely to employ its legislative median status to move 
declared cabinet position toward its ideal point, thus potentially affecting subsequent policy outcomes 
in the welfare domain.  
The finding of a significant effect emanating from the parties holding the labour and social affairs 
ministers are consistent with the ministerial autonomy assumption that underpins Laver and Shepsle’s 
(1996: 281-285) portfolio allocation model. Indeed, even if the results highlight that declared cabinet 
position on the welfare dimension more closely reflects the policy positions of the entire cabinet, net 
of other factors, the parties of the labour and social affairs ministers do wield a degree of influence 
over declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension. This finding is consistent with the evidence 
provided by Barnes (2013), according to which the policy positions of the ministers responsible for 
welfare state programmes are strong determinants of the level of welfare generosity.   
Concerning external forces, declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension tends to respond to 
rising inflation rate experienced by the coalition parties when in office. 
Finally, it is worth recognizing the most important limitation affecting the analysis performed here, 
namely, data scarcity on the explanandum (i.e. declared cabinet positions). This paper assessed the 
degree of congruence between declared cabinet positions and the weighted mean positions of 
governing parties on the RILE and the welfare dimensions and proved that these two measures of 
government partisanship do not describe exactly the same phenomenon. As famously underlined by 
McDonald and Budge (2005: 141), government declarations ‘should certainly be taken as better 
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indicators of eventual policy than simple party electoral program intentions. They have the advantage 
of outlining a whole range of plans, for legislation and administration as well as spending’.  
Accordingly, it seems extremely important and promising that future research carry on the coding 
procedure of government declarations conducted by the Manifesto Research Group from the 
aftermath of WWII to the mid-1990s. This choice will allow comparison of government positions as 
derived from their declarations with those obtained by computing the weighted mean of coalition 
parties’ positions as derived from their electoral manifestos, thus exploiting a large amount of data 
already available online.  
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FIGURE 
 
Figure 1: Pairwise correlation between declared cabinet RILE and WELFARE positions 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Influences on declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Declared cabinet position lagged 0.175† 0.185* 0.186* 0.195* 
(0.093) (0.094) (0.092) (0.093) 
Cabinet weighted mean 0.309*** 0.204† 0.288** 0.309*** 
(0.092) (0.122) (0.091) (0.092) 
Median party – cabinet distance  -0.203 
  
 (0.159) 
  
PM’s party – cabinet distance 
  
0.417 
 
 
 
(0.257) 
 
Finance minister - cabinet distance 
 
 
 
0.234 
 
 
 
(0.177) 
Change in inflation rate 0.321 -0.0951 0.167 0.321 
(0.852) (0.902) (0.844) (0.832) 
Change in unemployment rate -0.211 -0.793 0.045 -0.689 
(1.400) (1.465) (1.399) (1.415) 
Change in GDP -0.855 -1.155 -1.094 -1.087 
(1.037) (1.080) (1.032) (1.031) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.950 -1.184 1.234 1.498 
 (4.573) (4.886) (4.552) (4.564) 
R2 0.360 0.368 0.376 0.370 
N 147 147 145 147 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is declared cabinet position on the RILE dimension. Model M3 has 145 observations rather than 147 
because the variable PM’s party - cabinet distance is missing for the governments Barre I and II in 
France. Indeed, Raymond Barre has never been affiliated to any party.  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 2: Influences on declared cabinet position on the WELFARE dimension 
 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Declared cabinet position lagged 0.101 0.061 0.107 0.099 
(0.085) (0.084) (0.086) (0.084) 
Cabinet weighted mean 0.126† 0.317** 0.129† 0.127† 
(0.075) (0.103) (0.076) (0.075) 
Median party – cabinet distance  0.281*   
 (0.123)   
PM’s party – cabinet distance   -0.044  
  (0.228)  
Labour and social affair ministers - cabinet 
distance 
   0.007† 
   (0.004) 
Change in inflation rate 0.413† 0.461* 0.424† 0.420† 
(0.239) (0.227) (0.238) (0.239) 
Change in unemployment rate 0.373 0.412 0.365 0.384 
(0.355) (0.347) (0.360) (0.355) 
Change in GDP -0.149 -0.075 -0.156 -0.150 
 (0.262) (0.242) (0.261) (0.262) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -6.660** -3.394 -6.526** -6.669** 
 
(2.205) (2.487) (2.223) (2.199) 
R2 0.334 0.362 0.337 0.340 
N 147 147 145 147 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable 
is declared cabinet position on the welfare dimension. Model M7 has 145 observations rather than 
147 because the variable PM’s party - cabinet distance is missing for the governments Barre I and II 
in France. Indeed, Raymond Barre has never been affiliated to any party.  
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 3: Simultaneous influences on declared cabinet RILE and WELFARE positions 
 M9 M10 
 RILE dimension WELFARE dimension 
Declared cabinet position lagged 0.214* 0.045 
(0.092) (0.085) 
Cabinet weighted mean 0.261* 0.329** 
(0.113) (0.103) 
Median party – cabinet distance -0.102 0.310* 
(0.150) (0.126) 
PM’s party – cabinet distance 0.443† -0.043 
(0.260) (0.227) 
Minister - cabinet distance 0.252 0.046† 
(0.179) (0.028) 
Change in inflation rate 0.253 0.367† 
(0.773) (0.202) 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 1.498 -3.324 
 
(4.783) (2.493) 
R2 0.386 0.370 
N 145 145 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Models M9 and M10 
have 145 observations rather than 147 because the variable PM’s party -cabinet distance is missing 
for the governments Barre I and II in France. Indeed, Raymond Barre has never been affiliated to 
any party. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table 1: The coverage of the CMP government declarations data 
Country Range of 
governments with 
coded declarations 
Number of coded 
declarations 
Total number of 
governments in 
range 
Belgium 1946-1981 23 29 
Denmark 1947-1987 15 23 
France V Republic 1959-1984 14 18 
(West) Germany  1949-2002 18 27 
Ireland 1981-1987 2 3 
Italy 1948-1983 38 39 
Luxembourg 1945-1984 9 13 
Netherlands 1946-1994 7 20 
Norway 1945-1989 11 21 
Sweden 1948-1990 20 20 
This table shows the range of governments included in this analysis. Each range starts no earlier 
than the year of formation of the first government after the initial post-war election and runs to 
the end of the final government whose declaration was coded. The total number of governments 
that were formed in each range is shown. 
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Appendix Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Declared cabinet position  
on the RILE dimension 
overall -0.221 16.793 -45.08 55.1 
between  10.366 -21.06 10.616 
within  14.454 -35.291 50.701 
Declared cabinet position  
on the welfare dimension 
overall -7.146 5.675 -40.91 3.2 
between  3.362 -13.773 -4.24 
within  4.813 -35.75 6.628 
Cabinet weighted  mean   
on the RILE dimension 
overall -7.976 16.933 -61.4 45.854 
between  12.384 -28.416 7.413 
within  12.926 -43.811 36.377 
Cabinet weighted  mean  
on the welfare dimension 
overall -11.719 7.72 -46.2 0.008 
between  5.211 -24.361 -6.427 
within  5.163 -33.557 9.142 
Median party – cabinet distance  
on the RILE dimension 
overall 0.542 11.847 -39.545 37.907 
between  7.718 -20.836 6.753 
within  10.97 -32.459 31.696 
Median party – cabinet distance  
on the welfare dimension 
overall 1.177 4.689 -12.2 26.9 
between  1.437 -0.138 3.863 
within  4.514 -13.707 25.393 
PM’s party – cabinet distance  
on the RILE dimension 
overall 0.236 5.938 -17.955 28.937 
between  3.87 -4.39 7.966 
within  5.305 -15.667 21.207 
PM’s party – cabinet distance  
on the welfare dimension 
overall -0.003 1.805 -6.36 6.592 
between  1.232 -0.947 2.536 
within  1.629 -5.983 6.774 
Finance minister –  cabinet distance  
on the RILE dimension 
overall 0.118 8.423 -21.021 54.079 
between  3.902 -4.433 6.733 
within 
 
 7.874 -17.519 48.883 
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Labour/social affairs minister –  cabinet  
distance on the welfare dimension 
overall 1.556 14.708 -34.499 56.707 
between  9.049 -16.164 13.120 
within  12.608 -30.932 45.143 
Change in inflation rate 
 
overall 0.193 1.647 -5 8.2 
between  0.852 -0.677 2.533 
within  1.526 -4.632 5.86 
Change in  unemployment rate overall 0.041 1 -2.6 7.5 
between  0.393 -0.185 1.167 
within  0.961 -3.025 6.551 
Change in GDP  overall 0.152 1.603 -8.9 6.5 
between  1.411 -1.5 3.8 
within  1.245 -7.248 3.852 
 
  
33 
Appendix Table 3: Pairwise correlations among declared cabinet position and cabinet weighted 
mean on the RILE and on the WELFARE dimensions 
 Declared cabinet 
position on the 
RILE d. 
Declared cabinet 
position on the 
welfare d. 
Cabinet 
weighted mean 
on the RILE d. 
Cabinet weighted  
mean on the 
welfare d. 
Declared cabinet 
position on the 
RILE d. 
1    
Declared cabinet 
position on the 
welfare d. 
0.566* 1   
Cabinet weighted 
mean on the 
RILE d. 
0.446* 0.436* 1  
Cabinet weighted 
mean on the 
welfare d. 
0.312* 0.401* 0.629* 1 
Notes: * p<0.001 or better. 
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Appendix Table 4: Pairwise correlations among variables referring to political actors on the RILE 
dimension 
 Declared 
cabinet 
position 
Cabinet 
weighted 
mean 
Median party 
– cabinet dist. 
PM’s party – 
cabinet dist. 
Minister - 
cabinet dist. 
Declared 
cabinet 
position 
1     
Cabinet 
weighted mean 
0.446* 1    
Median party – 
cabinet dist. 
-0.163* -0.535* 1   
PM’s party – 
cabinet dist. 
0.0891 0.102 -0.048 1  
Minister - 
cabinet dist. 
0.034 0.007 0.249* -0.081 1 
Notes: * p<0.05 or better. 
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Appendix Table 5: Pairwise correlations among variables referring to political actors on the 
WELFARE dimension 
 Declared 
cabinet 
position 
Cabinet 
weighted 
mean 
Median party 
– cabinet dist. 
PM’s party – 
cabinet dist. 
Minister - 
cabinet dist. 
Declared 
cabinet 
position 
1     
Cabinet 
weighted mean 
0.401* 1    
Median party – 
cabinet dist. 
0.019 -0.569* 1   
PM’s party – 
cabinet dist. 
-0.002 0.094 -0.185* 1  
Minister - 
cabinet dist. 
0.129 0.065 -0.07 0.13 1 
Notes: * p<0.05 or better. 
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Appendix Table 6: Influences on declared cabinet RILE and WELFARE positions without 
overlapping cases 
 M2 without 
overlaps 
M3 without 
overlaps 
M4 without 
overlaps 
M6 without 
overlaps 
M7 without 
overlaps 
M8 without 
overlaps 
Declared 
cabinet 
positiont-1 
-0.031 0.00597 0.189+ 0.348* 0.530*** 0.235† 
(0.132) (0.123) (0.104) (0.154) (0.114) (0.137) 
Cabinet 
weighted mean 
0.555* 0.425*** 0.328** 0.405** 0.103* 0.121** 
(0.257) (0.106) (0.105) (0.134) (0.0491) (0.044) 
Median party – 
cabinet dist. 
0.109 
 
 0.368***   
(0.297) 
 
 (0.105)   
PM’s party – 
cabinet dist. 
 0.749*   0.048  
 (0.296)   (0.357)  
Finance minister 
- cabinet dist. 
  0.339    
  (0.208)    
Lab./Soc. 
minister – 
cabinet dist. 
     0.007*** 
     (0.002) 
N 76 74 138 81 79 92 
Notes: OLS estimations with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Control variables 
omitted for purpose of readability. All these model specifications replicate the corresponding models 
in Tables 1 and 2 by dropping from the sample observations in which the party of the PM, of the 
finance and of the labour/social affairs ministers expresses also the median parliamentarian. † p<0.10, 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
1 Note that the operationalisation of the formateur party as the PM’s party is forced by data 
availability. However, it is worth to remind that the agenda-setting power enjoyed by the party 
expressing the PM may derives by additional sources: e.g., individual leadership, personal 
communication and presentational style (fostered by professional spin-doctors). By now, we cannot 
disentangle the role played by such individual factors, but we keep them in mind for future 
developments of the present research. 
2 Note that government declarations do not coincide with coalition agreements. Coalition agreements 
are extra-parliamentary means to promote discipline between governing parties. They tend to include 
the government’s policy agenda, the procedural rules under which the coalition parties will cooperate 
and the allocation of government offices (Strøm et al. 2008). Müller and Strøm (2008) conducted an 
extensive study on 262 coalition agreements in 15 West-European countries over the period 1945–
1999. Of these coalition agreements, 67% were concluded immediately after elections; 21% were 
negotiated during a parliamentary term, and 7.6% were purely pre-electoral. Of the written coalition 
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agreements, 83% were intended for the public domain, while the remaining agreements were kept 
private. 
3 Accordingly, electoral manifestos reveal parties’ dual nature of policy and office seeking actors and, 
thus, are affected by strategic dynamics. Moreover, parties are collective actors whose members 
display similar but non-identical policy positions. A growing field of literature focused on intra-party 
politics (e.g. Greene and Haber 2014) has shown that party positions expressed in party manifestos 
well approximate the mean position of party internal factions, weighted by their share of seats in the 
party bodies. 
4 The literature suggests alternative measures to assess cabinets’ ideological positions (see, for 
example, Electoral Studies 26 (1), 2007). However, being aware of the critiques addressed to the 
coding-scheme, the traditional RILE position derived from it has been employed to make the results 
of this paper directly comparable with those obtained by previous influential studies on the same topic 
(Warwick, 2001, 2011). 
5 Only half of the parliamentary median parties covered by this study coincide on both dimensions: 
51% of the parties of the median legislator on the RILE dimension are also the parties of the median 
legislator on the welfare dimension (pairwise correlation=0.28*). Moreover, as proven by other 
analyses (e.g. Laver and Budge 1992: 409-430, Müller and Strøm 2000), the party of the median 
legislator is also a member of the governing coalition under multiparty PR systems about 80% of 
time. Furthermore, the party of the median legislator is almost always involved in the government 
coalition, if not the single-government party, in SMD systems. This means that the RILE and the 
welfare positions of the median parliamentary parties also enter into the computation of cabinet 
weighted mean. Pairwise correlations are reported by Appendix Tables 4 and 5. Moreover, all the 
models have been tested for collinearity, and no problem has been detected.  
6 As in Warwick (2001), annualized monthly inflation rates were calculated from data on consumer 
prices provided by the International Labor Review (1945–1963), the Bulletin of Labor Statistics 
(1964–1970) and the International Financial Statistics (1970–1990). Unemployment data came 
primarily from the U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (1947–1990), supplemented by the OECD 
Main Economic Indicators. Historical Statistics 1969-88 (1990). 
7 The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the model specifications results in the loss of 10 
cases. Moreover, because declared cabinet positions are not coded for every government (see 
Appendix Table 1), the inclusion of this variable would have generated an additional loss of cases. 
As in Warwick (2011), this concern is addressed by means of multiple imputation (King et al. 2001). 
Notice that this technique is employed only to estimate a value for the lagged dependent variable 
when the immediately preceding government is missing and not to add un-coded observations to the 
sample. 
8 Testing the influences on declared cabinet position emanating from different political actors at once 
also allows to control for identity of parties in key situations (the parliamentary median party, the 
PM’s party and the party holding the finance/labour and social affairs portfolios may overlap). To 
verify the empirical relationships among these key players, the Appendix provides two correlation 
matrices of all these variables (i.e. Appendix Tables 4 and 5). Moreover, post-estimation checks for 
collinearity have been run: no problem has been detected. Finally, Appendix Table 6 displays 
replicates models dropping overlapping cases from the sample: results hold.  
9 These results differ from those of Warwick (2001). Indeed, the betas referring to the roles of the 
PM’s party and the finance minister parties are correctly signed, but they do not reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance. This happens because this paper employs the standard two-tailed 
test, while Warwick chose the one-tailed test. 
10 Note that on the RILE dimension, the party of the parliamentary median legislator and the PM is 
the same in 47% of the governments under scrutiny. Appendix Table 4 shows that the pairwise 
correlation between these two variables does not pose collinearity concerns. As displayed by models 
M2 and M3 in Table 1, the effects emanating from both the parliamentary median party (M2) and the 
PM’s party (M3) fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, the variable 
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referring to the PM’s party is quite close to statistical significance (p=0.105). This result suggests that 
in case of overlap, the additional leverage owned by this party on declared cabinet position is better 
explained by the fact that it is the party of the PM than by the fact that it occupies the median 
parliamentary position. This finding seems confirmed in Appendix Table 6. Model M9 in Table 3, 
which estimates the effects emanating from every key political player at once, will clarify this 
statement. 
11 All the models have been also estimated using GLS random effects models, GLS fixed effects 
models and standard OLS models. Overall, the results concerning political actors are confirmed. 
Tables are available upon request. 
